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The Unboundedness of the Plain; or the Ubiquity of Lilliput? How to Do Things with Thompson Clarke?

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In this essay, we focus primarily on Moore’s “Proof of an External World” and Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism.” We are not exactly commenting on Clarke’s “The Legacy of Skepticism,” interpreting it, although what we do involves us in (some of) that. Instead of directly commenting on it, we do things with Legacy; we read Moore’s Proof and Kant’s Refutation with Clarke in mind. And by way of doing this, we bring onto the stage a post-Legacy Moore, and a post-Legacy Kant. We do not claim to present Moore and Kant per se (to use Clarke’s term); we do not portray Moore and Kant as they are independently of “The Legacy of Skepticism.” We propose instead Moore and Kant as we read them after Legacy, i.e., in light of the pure/plain distinction.

Affiliations: 1: Auburn University, kzg0003@auburn.edu; 2: Auburn University, kellydeanjolley@gmail.com

10.1163/22105700-04031161
/content/journals/10.1163/22105700-04031161
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2014-10-08
2018-09-19

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