Cookies Policy

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Skepticism and Elegance

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this article

+ Tax (if applicable)
Add to Favorites
You must be logged in to use this functionality

An Explanationist Rejoinder

image of International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

Jonathan Vogel has argued in support of an explanationist response to skepticism in several works. Central to this explanationist response is the fact that our non-skeptical view of the world (the Real World Hypothesis, RWH) is a better explanation of our experiences than its skeptical rivals. Despite the plausibility of this response to skepticism, it is not without its critics. Recently, Matthew Gifford has argued that Vogel’s response has problems on two fronts. First, Gifford argues that Vogel’s strategy for showing that the RWH is a better explanation than its skeptical rivals fails. Second, he argues that if Vogel’s strategy does succeed, then it accomplishes too much—it removes skeptical doubts when it should not. I argue that Gifford is mistaken on both accounts.

Affiliations: 1: University of Alabama at Birmingham,


Full text loading...


Data & Media loading...

1. Beebe J. (2009). “"The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism",” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol 79: 605636.
2. Gifford M. B. (2013). “"Skepticism and Elegance: Problems for the Abductivist Reply to Cartesian Skepticism",” Philosophical Studies Vol 164: 685704.
3. Hintikka J. (1998). “"What Is Abduction? The Fundamental Problem of Contemporary Epistemology",” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy Vol 34: 503533.
4. Lycan W. (1988). Judgement and Justification . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. ———. (2002). “"Explanation and Epistemology".” In Moser P. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology , 408433. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. McCain K. (2014). Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification . New York: Routledge.
7. Minnameier G. (2004). “"Peirce-Suit of Truth-Why Inference to the Best Explanation and Abduction Ought Not to Be Confused",” Erkenntnis Vol 60: 75105.
8. Poston T. (2014). Reason & Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism . London: Palgrave Macmillan.
9. Pryor J. (2000). “"The Skeptic and the Dogmatist",” Noûs Vol 24: 517549.
10. Putnam H. (1973). “"Reductionism and the Nature of Psychology",” Cognition Vol 2: 131146.
11. Vogel J. (1990). “"Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation",” Journal of Philosophy Vol 87: 658666.
12. ———. (2005). “"The Refutation of Skepticism".” In Steup M. , and Sosa E. (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology , 7284. Malden, ma: Blackwell Publishing.
13. ———. (2008). “"Internalist Responses to Skepticism".” In Greco J. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism , 533556. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14. Weslake B. (2010). “"Explanatory Depth",” Philosophy of Science Vol 77: 273294.

Article metrics loading...



Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Subscribe to ToC alert
  • Get permissions
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism — Recommend this title to your library
  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation