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Skepticism and Spatial Objects

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image of International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

I defend external world realism. I assume that the principle of inference to the best explanation is justified: roughly, a hypothesis that provides a better explanation of the total evidence is more probable than one that does not. I argue that the existence of a world of spatial objects provides a systematic explanation of the spatial contents of visual experience, and that it provides a better explanation than traditional skeptical hypotheses. This paper thus pursues the explanationist strategy of Laurence BonJour and Jonathan Vogel. It is an improved, more compelling defense, for at least two reasons. First, the attention to spatial properties, and in particular to what I call perspectival projections, makes the explanatory power of the realist hypothesis much more vivid and concrete. Second, the argument preserves and elucidates much that seems correct in the explanationist arguments others have offered while avoiding significant problems and shortcomings.

Affiliations: 1: University of Iowa,


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1. BonJour L., (2003). “"A Version of Internalist Foundationalism".” In BonJour L., and Sosa E. (eds.), Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues , 596. Malden, ma: Blackwell.
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