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Full Access A Defense of Burge's "Self-Verifying Judgments"

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A Defense of Burge's "Self-Verifying Judgments"

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People have worried about the compatibility of anti-individualism and knowledge of the contents of one's thoughts. Skepticism about such knowledge rears its ugly head. The first—classic—response to such worries was Tyler Burge's contention that a subclass of judgments about one's own mental states are cogito-like: they are self-verifying, thereby guaranteed to be true. Finn Spicer has recently put forward an interesting argument against Burge's claim. In this paper, I defend Burge's account of self-verification against Spicer's argument.

10.1163/221057011X554106
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/content/journals/10.1163/221057011x554106
2011-04-01
2016-07-28

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