Cookies Policy

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

The Dogmatists and Wright on Moore’s “Proof”

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this article

+ Tax (if applicable)
Add to Favorites
You must be logged in to use this functionality

image of International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

Suppose one has a visual experience as of having hands, and then reasons as follows: (MOORE) (1) I have hands, (2) If I have hands an external world exists; (3) An external world exists. Suppose one’s visual experience gives one defeasible perceptual warrant, or justification, to believe (1) – that is, one’s experience makes it epistemically appropriate to believe (1). And suppose one comes to believe (1) on the basis of this visual experience. The conditional premise (2) is knowable a priori. And (3) can be established by modus ponens inference. If one reasons thus, say one’s engaged in (MOORE)-reasoning. What, if anything, is wrong with (MOORE)-reasoning? I consider two prominent responses to this question – the dogmatists’ and Crispin Wright’s. Each finds fault in (MOORE)-reasoning, but on different grounds. I argue Wright’s response faces a problem which is standardly only taken to be faced by dogmatists.

Affiliations: 1: Oxford University


Full text loading...


Data & Media loading...

1. Bach K. “ "Statements and Beliefs Without Truth-aptitude".” MS available at
2. Burge T. ( 1993). “ "Content Preservation",” The Philosophical Review Vol 102: 45788. [Crossref]
3. ––––. ( 2003). “ "Perceptual Entitlement",” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol 67: 50348. [Crossref]
4. Cohen S. ( 1999). “ "Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons",” Philosophical Perspectives Vol 13: 5789.
5. Davies M. ( 2004). “ "Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission and Easy Knowledge",” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume Vol 78: 21345. [Crossref]
6. ––––. ( 2009). “ "Two Purposes of Arguing and Two Epistemic Projects",” 337–83 in Ravenscroft I. (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. Dretske F. ( 1970). “ "Epistemic Operators",” Journal of Philosophy Vol 67: 100723. [Crossref]
8. Field H. ( 1994). “ "Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse",” Philosophical Review Vol 103: 40552. [Crossref]
9. Peacocke C. ( 2003). The Realm of Reason . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10. Pollock J. ( 1986). Contemporary Theories of Knowledge . Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.
11. Pritchard D. ,( 2005). “ "Wittgenstein’s On Certaintyand Contemporary Anti-scepticism",” 189224in Moyal-Sharrock D. , Brenner W. (eds.), Investigating On Certainty: Essays on Wittgenstein’s Last Work . London: Palgrave McMillan.
12. Pryor J. ( 2000). “ "The Skeptic and the Dogmatist",” Noûs Vol 34: 51749. [Crossref]
13. ––––. ( 2004). “ "What’s Wrong with Moore’s Argument?",” Philosophical Issues Vol 14: 34978. [Crossref]
14. ––––. (Forthcoming). “When Warrant Transmits,” in A. Coliva (ed.), Mind, Meaning and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
15. Silins N. ( 2007). “ "Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic",” Oxford Studies in Epistemology Vol 2: 10840.
16. White R. ( 2006). “ "Problems for Dogmatism",” Philosophical Studies Vol 131: 52557. [Crossref]
17. Wittgenstein L. ( 1969). On Certainty . Oxford: Blackwell.
18. Wright C. ( 1985). “ "Facts and Certainty",” Proceedings of the British Academy Vol 71: 42972.
19. ––––. ( 2003). “ "Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference",” 5778in Nuccetelli S. (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
20. ––––. ( 2004). “ "Warrant for Nothing (And Foundations for Free?)",” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume Vol 78: 167212. [Crossref]
21. ––––. ( 2007). “ "The Perils of Dogmatism",” 2548in Nuccetelli S. , Seay G. (eds.), Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
22. ––––. ( 2008). “ "Internal-External: Doxastic Norms and Defusing of Sceptical Paradoxes",” Journal of Philosophy Vol 105: 50117.

Article metrics loading...



Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Subscribe to ToC alert
  • Get permissions
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism — Recommend this title to your library
  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation