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Full Access Two Ways to Be Right about What One Is Thinking

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Two Ways to Be Right about What One Is Thinking

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image of International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

In this paper I describe two ways in which cogito-like judgments (judgments about what one is currently thinking) might be self-verifying. I then defend my claim that the only one of these is available to Burge as a coherent way for him to elaborate his claim that cogito-like judgments are both self-verifying and central to our rationality.

10.1163/221057011X554160
/content/journals/10.1163/221057011x554160
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/content/journals/10.1163/221057011x554160
2011-04-01
2016-10-01

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