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Full Access Two Ways to Be Right about What One Is Thinking

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Two Ways to Be Right about What One Is Thinking

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In this paper I describe two ways in which cogito-like judgments (judgments about what one is currently thinking) might be self-verifying. I then defend my claim that the only one of these is available to Burge as a coherent way for him to elaborate his claim that cogito-like judgments are both self-verifying and central to our rationality.


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