Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism
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This paper explores the bearing of Tyler Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement on the problem of scepticism. Perceptual entitlement is an external form of warrant, connected with his perceptual anti-individualism. According to his view, an individual can be entitled to a perceptual belief without having reasons warranting the belief. On the face of it, this suggests that the view may have anti-sceptical resources. In short, the question is whether Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement allows us to outright deny that we in our philosophical theory need a reason to reject the sceptical scenario. The answer to this question is ‘no’. However, as I go on to show, Burge’s position includes further resources that allow for an anti-sceptical argument.
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