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Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism

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image of International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

This paper explores the bearing of Tyler Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement on the problem of scepticism. Perceptual entitlement is an external form of warrant, connected with his perceptual anti-individualism. According to his view, an individual can be entitled to a perceptual belief without having reasons warranting the belief. On the face of it, this suggests that the view may have anti-sceptical resources. In short, the question is whether Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement allows us to outright deny that we in our philosophical theory need a reason to reject the sceptical scenario. The answer to this question is ‘no’. However, as I go on to show, Burge’s position includes further resources that allow for an anti-sceptical argument.

Affiliations: 1: University of Oslo


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1. Brueckner A. ,( 2007). “ "Content Externalism, Entitlement, and Reasons",” 160–76 in Goldberg S. (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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6. ———. (2003c). “Some Reflections on Scepticism: Reply to Stroud,” 335–46 in Hahn and Ramberg (2003).
7. ———. ( 2009). “ "Five Theses on De Re States and Attitudes",” 246–316 in Almog J. , Leonardi P. (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. ———. ( 2010a). “ "Modest Dualism",” 233–50 in Koons R. C. , Bealer G. (eds.), The Waning of Materialism . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9. ———. ( 2010b). “ "Steps toward Origins of Propositional Thought",” Disputatio Vol Vol. IV, No. 29: 3967.
10. Hahn M. , Ramberg B. (eds.). ( 2003). Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge . Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books, MIT Press.

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