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The Two Modes of Scepticism and the Aporetic Structure of Foundationalism

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The purpose of the present article is to show that the key to understanding the philosophical meaning of the Two Modes of Scepticism is directly linked to the metaepistemic function performed by the criterion of truth (kriterion tes aletheias) in the Hellenistic theories of knowledge. Since the criterion can also be regarded as an epistemic instrument through which it is possible to immediately identify the foundational elements upon which our knowledge of the world is based, the Two Modes show the problems that arise when we try to incontrovertibly identify a set of special and foundational elements that have no need of further justification.

Affiliations: 1: Sapienza – University of Rome, Italy, massimo.catapano@uniroma1.it

10.1163/24680974-02901006
/content/journals/10.1163/24680974-02901006
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/content/journals/10.1163/24680974-02901006
2017-03-01
2017-04-24

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