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The Legitimacy of Provisional General Budget Laws in the Jordanian Legal System

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This study examines the legitimacy of the recurrent conduct, adopted by the JordanianExecutive Power, of issuing Provisional General Budget Laws, in the absence of theLegislative Power. This study proves the unconstitutionality of such conduct, and looksat the prospects of progress in the future.Issuing Provisional General Budget Laws is a culmination of several misconceptionsof some important Constitutional Articles; especially the ones that reflect how the principleof separation of powers is adopted in the Jordanian Constitution, and how thedifferent interlocking functions of both the Executive and the Legislative Powers shouldbe interpreted and applied.Article 94, providing for the legislative function of the Executive Power in theabsence of the Legislative Power, is interpreted and applied broadly. Issuing ProvisionalGeneral Budget Laws mean that the Executive Power assumes the legislative Power andnot a temporary legislative role, as provided in the Constitution. Hence, contradictinganother two important systems provided therein: first, the financial check, as part of thechecks and balances system, provided in Chapter Eight, especially Article 112. Second,the apportionment method, provided in Article 113, which should be applied in theabsence of the Legislator.Unfortunately, the 2011 Constitutional Reform, although somewhat progressive, doesnot remove such well-rooted misconceptions; leaving the Constitutional Court as thelast resort in rectifying the situation.


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