Cookies Policy
X

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Taking the Distinction between Persons Seriously

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this article

+ Tax (if applicable)
Add to Favorites

image of Journal of Moral Philosophy

Rawls criticizes utilitarianism for not taking the distinction between persons seriously, and suggests that his own theory: justice as fairness, does. I argue that justice as fairness aims to take the distinction seriously at four levels, ranging from the content of its principles to its conception of political philosophy, and that doing so at each stage is of fundamental importance in working out the basis of a conception of justice for a democratic society. Understanding Rawls’s theory in this way points to a clearer understanding of how to go on doing political philosophy after Rawls.

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Chicago, 601 S. Morgan Street, Chicago, IL 60607, USA, Email: laden@uic.edu

10.1177/174046810400100304
/content/journals/10.1177/174046810400100304
dcterms_title,pub_keyword,dcterms_description,pub_author
6
3
Loading
Loading

Full text loading...

/content/journals/10.1177/174046810400100304
Loading

Data & Media loading...

http://brill.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1177/174046810400100304
Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1177/174046810400100304
2004-11-01
2016-09-30

Sign-in

Can't access your account?
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation