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Virtue Epistemology and Moral Luck

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Thomas Nagel has proposed that the existence of moral luck mandates a general attitude of skepticism in ethics. One popular way of arguing against Nagel’s claim is to insist that the phenomenon of moral luck itself is an illusion , in the sense that situations in which it seems to occur may be plausibly re-described so as to show that agents need not be held responsible for the unlucky outcomes of their actions. Here I argue that this strategy for explaining away moral luck fails because it does not take account of the fact that agents in morally unlucky circumstances are uniformly subject to a very specific type of epistemic obligation. I then proceed to sketch out an alternative strategy for blocking the inference to skepticism, one that makes use of the distinctive explanatory resources provided by epistemic virtue theory.

Affiliations: 1: Philosophy Department, University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, OK, USA, Email: marksilcox@netzero.com

10.1177/1740468106065491
/content/journals/10.1177/1740468106065491
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/content/journals/10.1177/1740468106065491
2006-07-01
2016-12-09

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