Cookies Policy
X
Cookie Policy

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Turning on Default Reasons

MyBook is a cheap paperback edition of the original book and will be sold at uniform, low price.

Buy this article

Price:
$30.00+ Tax (if applicable)
Add to Favorites

Particularism takes an extremely ecumenical view of what considerations might count as reasons and thereby threatens to ‘flatten the moral landscape’ by making it seem that there is no deep difference between, for example, pain, and shoelace color. After all, particularists have claimed, either could provide a reason provided a suitable moral context. To avoid this result, some particularists draw a distinction between default and non-default reasons. The present paper argues that all but the most deflationary ways of drawing this distinction are either implausible or else insufficient to help the particularist avoid flattening the moral landscape. The difficulty can be avoided, however, if we reject particularism's extremely ecumenical view of reasons.

Affiliations: 1: Dept of Philosophy, Davidson College, Davidson, NC, USA, Email: semckeever@davidson.edu; 2: Dept of Philosophy, Edinburgh University Edinburgh, Scotland;, Email: mridge@staffmail.ed.ac.uk

Sign-in

Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Create email alert
  • Get permissions
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Name:*
    Email:*
    Your details
    Name:*
    Email:*
    Department:*
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
     
     
     
     
    Other:
     
    Journal of Moral Philosophy — Recommend this title to your library

    Thank you

    Your recommendation has been sent to your librarian.

  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation