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Defending the Right

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In this paper I consider what might be my best response to various difficulties and challenges that emerged at a conference held at the University of Kent in December 2004, the contributions to which are given in the same volume. I comment on Crisp's distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate reasons, and reply to McKeever and Ridge on default reasons, and to Norman on the idea of a reason for action. I don't here consider what other particularists might want to say; I certainly don't think that my way of doing these things is the only possible one, but not surprisingly I am interested in seeing what resources it might have to defend itself.

Affiliations: 1: Dept of Philosophy, University of Reading, UK; University of Texas, USA, Email: j.p.dancy@reading.ac.uk

10.1177/1740468106072790
/content/journals/10.1177/1740468106072790
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/content/journals/10.1177/1740468106072790
2007-04-01
2016-09-25

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