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Moral and Theological Realism: The Explanatory Argument

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There are striking parallels, largely unexplored in the literature, between skeptical arguments against theism and against moral realism. After sketching four arguments meant to do this double duty, I restrict my attention to an explanatory argument that claims that we have most reason to deny the existence of moral facts (and so, by extrapolation, theistic ones), because such putative facts have no causal-explanatory power. I reject the proposed parity, and offer reasons to think that the potential vulnerabilities of moral realism on this front are quite different from those of the theist.

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

10.1177/1740468107083247
/content/journals/10.1177/1740468107083247
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/content/journals/10.1177/1740468107083247
2007-10-01
2016-10-01

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