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Does self-interest skew state reporting of greenhouse gas emissions? A preliminary analysis based on the first verified emissions estimates under the Kyoto Protocol

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The paper considers the changes to the base-year GHG-emission inventories of Annex I parties to the Kyoto Protocol (herein referred to, simply, as Annex B parties) made in the course of the review of those inventories by expert review teams. I ask whether, in the reporting practices of these states, any general tendency is observable of states misreporting (at an advantage to themselves) their emissions prior to the expert review. I conclude that the information to date raises many questions but provides few concrete answers; nevertheless, the issue points to an important area of study within the larger field of environmental governance.


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